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VII. — “*Extended*” and “*Remote*” *Deliberatives in Greek.*

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I.

IN his Att. Syntax, published in 1843, Krüger (§ 54, 7, A. 2) in effect held that no cases of the indirect deliberative subjunctive were found that could not be solved by regarding the introductory phrases οὐκ ἔχω and the like as equivalent to ἀπορῶ. In 1847, Madvig, in his Synt. d. gr. Sprache, § 121, included, under the head of the deliberative subjunctive, two examples which cannot be so explained (Pl. Symp. 194 and Isocr. 4, 44, for which see p. 160 of this paper), though he did not discuss them. Aken's procedure in his Grundzüge (1861), § 292, is similar; and so is Kühner's, as late even as 1870, in the second edition of his Gr. Gramm., §§ 559, 3, and 394, 5. Professor Goodwin, in his Greek Moods and Tenses, second edition (1865), § 65, 3, treats the dependent clause in ἔχει ὅτι εἴπῃ, on the ground of its affinities, under the head of the final sentence, but explains it as “caused by the analogy of the common expression οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι (or τί) εἴπῃ, equivalent to οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι εἴπῃ, *he knows not what he shall say*, which contains an indirect question”; and in a note on p. 135 of Felton's edition of the Panegyric of Isocrates he expresses the same view with more fulness, making it clear that the construction in his view is of deliberative origin, although in ἔχω ὅτι εἴπῃ “all trace of the indirect question disappears.” In later editions he continues to hold substantially the same view. Monro, in his Homeric Grammar (first edition, 1882, § 282, and at the same place in the edition of 1891), placed his statement, “in Attic the idiom survives in a few phrases, as ἔχει ὅτι εἴπῃ,” under the general head of “final relative clauses” and the specific head of “the Relative of Purpose with the Subjunctive.”

Such was the state of opinion, when a note in Professor Jebb's *Philoctetes*, upon ὀρώντα . . . οὐδέν' ἔντοπον, οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, v. 281, brought the matter into formal discussion. The beginning of the note reads thus: "The direct question is τίς ἀρκέση; (deliberative, or 'interrogative' subjunctive)." In a notice of the edition, published in the *Classical Review* for April, 1891, Mr. Arthur Sidgwick comments as follows: "The note begins by treating the sentence as an oblique deliberative: but if this be right, as it probably is, it should be pointed out that the construction is so stretched that *the interrogative character is lost*. The fact I believe to be that the deliberative construction is subtly modified, and three stages may be traced as follows: First stage, οὐκ ᾔδειν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, 'I did not know who was to aid,'—truly interrogative and deliberative; second stage, οὐκ εἶχον ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, where the interrogative character is sliding into the relative; third stage, οὐδέν' εἶχον ὅστις κ.τ.λ., where the relative character of ὅστις is established. The last usage is what we have here: it is so like the Latin final *qui* with subjunctive that few readers or commentators stop to notice the difference; but it certainly is not that, else we could say ἔπεμψα ὅστις ἀγγέλλοι, which we cannot do: it is always ἀγγελεῖ." Mr. Sidgwick appends the form in which he himself would have cast the note: "This is an extension of the deliberative construction, used after negative sentences, which becomes at last practically equivalent to the final."

In the *Classical Review* for July, 1891, Professor Tarbell, in a brief article, speaks of the construction as "the extension of the dependent deliberative construction, after certain verbs, to relative clauses"; and, a little later, he cites Soph. Phil. 938 (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω) and Isocr. 21, 1 (οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορώ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουί) as illustrating the transition from interrogative to relative clauses, and adds the following:

"By regarding ἄλλον and προφάσεως as proleptic, we could explain the dependent clauses as ordinary indirect questions, without detriment to the sense. Most of the other passages,

however, resist such treatment. The cases after *ἔστι* (Soph. Aj. 514 *ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω*; Eur. H. F. 1245 *γέμω κακῶν δὴ, κοῦκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπη τεθῆ*) are especially noteworthy, because here the verb is not even capable of being followed by an indirect question. *οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω* grows by an easy transition out of *οὐκ ἔχω εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω*, understood as meaning 'I have nothing to look to.'

Mr. Sidgwick's note had dealt only with optatives following a secondary tense. Of the fourteen examples cited in Mr. Tarbell's paper, a few were optatives after a secondary tense, but the larger part were subjunctives after a primary tense. Before we proceed further, it will be necessary to have all these examples before us, together with others that have been contributed since. (One example of my own finding I shall add later.) The arrangement is chronological. [Examples in which *οὐχ ἔχω* may be interpreted as equivalent to *οὐκ οἶδα* are omitted.]

*τοιαῦτα μηχανήματ' ἐξευρὼν τάλας
βροτοῖσιν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῳ
τῆς νῦν παρούσης πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ.* — Aesch. P. V. 469.

*ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω
πλὴν σοῦ.* — Soph. Ai. 514.

*ὦ λιμένες, ὦ προβλήτες, ὦ ξυνουσίαι
θηρῶν ὀρείων, ὦ χαταρρώγες πέτραι,
ὕμιν τάδ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω,
ἀνακλαίομαι παροῦσι τοῖς εἰωθόσιν,
οἷ' ἔργ' ὁ παῖς μ' ἔδρασεν οὕξ' Ἀχιλλεύς.* — Soph. Phil. 936.

*ὀρῶντα μὲν ναῦς, ἅς ἔχων ἐναυστόλουν,
πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἐντοπον,
οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' ὅστις νόσου
κάμνοντι συλλάβοιτο.* — Soph. Phil. 279.

*οὐκ ἔχων βάσιν,
οὐδέ τιν' ἐγγώρων κακογείτονα,
παρ' ᾧ στόνον ἀντίτυπον βαρυβρῶτ' ἀποκλαύσειεν αἵματηρόν·*

ὃς τὰν θερμοτάταν αἰμάδα κηκιομέναν ἐλκέων
ἐνθήρου ποδὸς ἡπίοισι
φύλλοις κατευνάσειεν. — Soph. Phil. 691.

οἶμοι, προδέδομαι, κούκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες,
ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον Ἀργείων φύγω·
οὗτος γὰρ ἦν μοι καταφυγὴ σωτηρίας. — Eur. Or. 722.

ΘΗ. ἴσχε στόμ', ὥς μὴ μέγα λέγων μεῖζον πάθῃς.

ΗΡ. γέμω κακῶν δὴ, κούκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπου τεθῇ.

— Eur. H. F. 1244.

οὐδένα γὰρ εἶχον ὅστις Ἀργόθεν μολῶν
εἰς Ἀργὸς αὐθις τὰς ἐμὰς ἐπιστολάς
πέμψειε. — Eur. I. T. 588.

τίν' ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἤκεις, ἐφ' ὅτῳ κινσῶμεν ἀγνιάς ;

— Ar. Eq. 1321.¹

εἰ δὲ μήτε δι' ὃ τι μήτε ὅτοις μήτε ἀφ' ὅτου πολεμήσωμεν
ἔστι, πῶς οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὴν εἰρήνην ποιητέον ἡμῖν ;

— Andoc. 3. 16.²

ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν
φίλων, ἂν εὖ γένηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ.

— Xen. Anab. 1, 7, 7.

ἐὰν μὲν οὖν νικῶσι, τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λύειν τὴν γέφυραν ; οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἂν πολλαὶ γέφυραι ὧσιν ἔχοιμεν ἂν ὅποι φυγόντες ἡμεῖς
σωθῶμεν. Ἐὰν δ' αὖ ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν, λελυμένης τῆς γεφύρας
οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ὅποι φύγωσιν. — Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 19.

δεῖ μέντοι τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔξειν ὅτι εἰσφέρωσιν
εἰς τὸ στεγνὸν τοῦ ἐργασομένου τὰς ἐν τῷ ὑπαίθρῳ ἐργασίας.

— Xen. Oec. 7, 20.

ἴσως οὖν καὶ Κηφισίου ἀντικατηγορήσει, καὶ ἔξει ὃ τι λέγει.

— Lys. 6, 42.

(λέγει is a sure emendation of Bekker's for λέγει.)

¹ Cited in the Classical Review for Febr., 1894, by Professor Sonnenschein, whose attention had been called to it by Mr. H. Richards. Professor Sonnenschein's article appeared too late to admit of special discussion here.

² Contributed privately by Professor Tarbell.

πρότερον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχων πρόφασιν ἐφ' ἧς τοῦ βίου λόγον
δοίην νυνὶ διὰ τοῦτον εἴληφα. — Lys. 24, 1.

τοιοῦτον ἔθος ἡμῖν παρέδωσαν, ὥστε . . . ἑκατέρους ἔχειν
ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν. — Isocr. 4, 43 and 44.

οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτονί.

— Isocr. 21, 1.

οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει αὐτῷ ὁπποῦν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὁτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι,
εἰ μόνον ἔχη ὅτ' διαλέγεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ.

— Plat. Symp. p. 194, D.

ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος
ἔχει ὅτι λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον. — Plat. Phaedr. p. 255, E.

(λέγει is a sure emendation of Bekker's for λέγει.)

οὐκ εἴχομεν ὅτου ἐπιλαβοίμεθα οὐδ' ὅτου κρατοίμεν.

— Dem. 35, 25.

οὐδὲ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τις ἔην ἐπὶ βουσί καὶ ἔργοις
φαινόμενος σπορίμοιο δι' αὐλακος, ὅντιν' ἐροίμην.

— Theocr. 25, 218.¹

In the Classical Review for March, 1892, under the heading of "The Subjunctive of Purpose in Relative Clauses in Greek," Dr. Earle, of Barnard College, combated Mr. Tarbell's position, holding, as Monro had held, that the idiom in question is descended from a clause of purpose, — a conclusion shared, without argument, by a writer in the same

¹ Contributed to me privately by Professor Tarbell, who also points out that the same construction occurs in Theocr. 16, 68, if we take the subordinate clause as relative:

δίξημαι δ', ὃ τινι θνατῶν κεχαρίσμενος ἔνθω
σὺν Μοῖσαις.

Οἷπερ φράσωσιν, which used to be read in Thuc. 7, 25, is generally replaced now by ὅπως φράσωσιν, the reading of the Vaticanus.

My colleague, Professor Burton, has pointed out two interesting examples in the New Testament, Mark 14, 14: ποῦ ἐστὶν τὸ κατάλυμά μου, ὅπου τὰ πάσχα μετὰ τῶν μαθητῶν μου φάγω; and Acts 21, 16: ἀγοντες παρ' ᾧ ξενισθῶμεν Μνάσωϊ τινι Κυπρίῳ, ἀρχαίῳ μαθητῇ (see also the footnote on p. 186). The latter probably touches the extreme point reached in the development of the construction.

journal, signing the initials J. D. to articles to be referred to in Part II. "The source of the error into which," as Mr. Earle thinks, "Mr. Tarbell and others have fallen" is a confusion among the three meanings of ἔχω, namely, "I have," "I know," and "I am able," and a confusion between the interrogative τίς and the indefinite or general relative ὅστις. The examples after ἔχω in the sense of "I know," as well as those after similar phrases like ἀμυχανῶ, Mr. Earle regards as indirectly deliberative. The examples after ἔχω in the sense of "I have," and examples after such phrases as οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδα, quoted above, and after such phrases as κοῦκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, he considers to be of final origin. With regard to a number of examples which he gives, he grants that it is difficult to determine whether ἔχω means "have" or "know," and consequently to decide whether the construction is final or deliberative, it being final in the former case, and deliberative in the latter.

Mr. Earle's specific argument¹ against Mr. Tarbell's explanation appears in a brief passage which I quote *verbatim* :

"Soph. Phil. 938 : ὑμῖν τὰδ', οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω may be paraphrased οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον ἔχω, καθὰ οἶδα, ὅτῳ λέγω. The fact that the antecedent is here expressed seems enough to show that there is no relation with an indirect question. So Isocr. 21, 1 :

οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω ὑπὲρ Νικίου τουτουί =
ἔχω προφασιν κτλ.,

where also the antecedent is expressed."

¹ A remark of Mr. Earle's, not in the nature of an argument, calls for a moment's notice : "As will be seen by the quotations I have made, more than one-half of Professor Tarbell's examples—'of the phenomenon which had not been recognized by any previous grammarian'—have been examined and discussed by Krüger and Goodwin." I am sure that others, like myself, would suppose, if they had before them only the passage which I have quoted, that Mr. Tarbell meant to say that no one before himself had recognized the phenomenon at all. What he actually wrote was "the phenomenon had not been *clearly* recognized, so far as I am aware, by any previous grammarian" [the italics are mine]; and nobody could read the passage in its context without seeing that Mr. Tarbell meant before Mr. Sidgwick, not before himself.

On what I have now quoted from Mr. Earle, three comments need to be made before we proceed to weigh the evidence.

First, neither Mr. Tarbell nor Mr. Sidgwick (if he be meant among the "others") can have fallen into error through overlooking an "ambiguity" between "*ὅστις*, an indefinite or general relative," and "*τίς* introducing an indirect question." Whether right or wrong in their theory, both—as the passages which I have quoted *verbatim* show—recognized as clearly as Mr. Earle himself that, in the examples which illustrate what they regard as the extreme point of development, the connective is not an interrogative, but a relative. In fact, the essential point of their belief is that the construction has been *extended* from the interrogative form to the relative form.

Secondly, I must express my dissent from the general attitude which is indicated in the sentence quoted from Mr. Earle. Nothing is surer than that extensions, and even new formations through association, take place in syntactical mechanisms, just as they do in word-meanings. Mr. Earle would be on no more dangerous ground if he were to say that our word "palace" cannot be descended from the name of a certain hill in Rome (to go no further back in the matter), because our word does not carry with it any idea of a hill. The fact that, in the last example, the antecedent is expressed, shows only that the dependent construction is at any rate no longer an indirect question, but not in the least that it did not originate in such a question.

The third comment is that, if Mr. Earle's argument were sound, a similar argument would, in the case of several of his examples, destroy his own explanation. Stripped of the individual form which it takes in this particular place, his canon would have to read somewhat as follows: If in a given example the full apparatus and full force of a given known construction do not exist, then the construction found in the example can have no relation with that known construction. What then becomes of the example in *Orestes* 722, which

Mr. Earle pronounces "another instance of the purpose-construction"? It runs as follows: *κοῦκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον Ἀργείων φύγω*, "*there are no longer any hopes to which I may turn and escape death at the hands of the Argives.*" The main sentence denies the existence of hopes. But hopes, we might make answer to Mr. Earle, do not exist in order that one may escape. Inasmuch, then, as the thought, though similar, is not identical with that of the purpose clause, there could — on Mr. Earle's canon — be no relation between this example and the construction of purpose.

But a positive refutation of this position can, I think, be given. Questions like *cur gaudeam*, in the sense of *why should I rejoice*, are well known. But there can be no doubt that in clauses of the common type seen in *nihil est cur gaudeas* or *nihil est quod gaudeas*, "*there is no reason why you should rejoice*," the introductory word is a relative, not an interrogative. It is, in fact, an interrogative turned relative,¹ — in other words, an example of a phenomenon exactly parallel, so far as this part of the mechanism is concerned, with the phenomenon contended for by Mr. Tarbell.

This evidence — if it be thought to be evidence — of the invalidity of Mr. Earle's argument undoes his work; but it of course does not solve the question.

Now it would seem to me entirely possible and natural that such a construction as the one under discussion should have been derived from either of the two sources claimed for it. From the deliberative question "to whom shall I speak" could easily come the chain of combinations, "I am at a loss to whom to speak," "I do not know to whom to speak," "I have no one to whom to speak," "there is no one to whom to speak," and even, at the extreme, "there is a man to whom to speak," — a construction not identical with that of purpose, but near enough to it to remind one of it. On the other hand, from the combination "he has built a bridge by which we may escape" could easily arise the combination "there is

¹ Such is, in my conception, the simple explanation of a much misunderstood construction.

a bridge by which we may escape," and, finally, "there is no bridge by which we may escape." Or, quite possibly, a more direct way could be struck out. Under the feeling "I must get me a weapon with which to defend myself," one might say "I have no weapon with which to defend myself." But, in either case, there is an extension. The alternatives between which we have to choose are not a plain clause of purpose and an extended construction of deliberation, but an extended clause of purpose and an extended deliberative clause.

What evidence, now, can be found to decide between these two rival theories, both of which are antecedently rational?

Three kinds of evidence might be looked for, turning upon three things which have to be accounted for; namely, (1) the range of introductory expressions after which the construction occurs, (2) the chronological order in which the various classes under this range are found to stand, and (3) the form of the construction.

(1) We are of course not dealing with the obvious cases of deliberative questions after verbs like ἀμχανῶ, ἀπορῶ or its opposite εὐπορῶ, but with the construction after such phrases as in οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδα ὅτφ λέγω, κοῦκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον φύγω, ἔξει ὅτι λέγει, etc. All of these with one exception (Ar. Eq. 1321) come under the head of the expression either of the existence of a difficulty, or (its opposite) the absence of a difficulty (existence of a means). Now this limitation is intelligible, if the construction is descended from that common form of the expression of difficulty, the question of perplexity, which is a shade of the deliberative subjunctive. It never got wholly out of sight of its starting-point. It could not be used, *e.g.* after a verb like "I give," "I send," "I appoint," for there is in the meaning of these verbs nothing to suggest anything like perplexity or difficulty. But, on the other hand, it is quite impossible to understand, on Mr. Earle's theory, why, after these and countless other verbs which are constantly being followed by purpose-clauses, the construction in question never appears.

(2) The second point at which evidence might perhaps be found is in the historical relation of the two kinds of expressions after which, with the exception already noted, the construction occurs; *viz.* the expression of the existence of a difficulty ("I am at a loss," etc.) and the expression of the existence of a means. Not only do 19 examples out of a total of 25 belong under the former type, but, with the same exception from Aristophanes, all the earlier examples belong to it down to the last from Xenophon, — which indeed, as the statement of the *necessity of the procuring* of a means, is not far removed, and forms the transition to the new type ("we have no means," "we must have a means," "we have a means"). This state of things, while not absolutely impossible upon the theory that the construction originates in a final clause, is yet, upon that theory, improbable, while it is precisely what we should look for upon the theory of a development from the deliberative subjunctive, as sketched in detail above.

(3) The third possible evidence lies in the form of the construction. And here, as it seems to me, Mr. Earle's theory receives its death-stroke. In all the examples of the subjunctive that have been cited on either side (with the exception of a single one from Hesiod, which I shall presently show to be of a different character), the mode is unattended by *ἄν* or *κε*. Yet, practically speaking, the clause of purpose introduced by the relative pronoun (the construction after *ἵνα* or *ὅφρα* is of course a different affair) took a subjunctive *with* *ἄν* or *κε*, or a future indicative, the former prevailing in Homer, the latter winning an almost complete triumph later. The subjunctive in Γ 459 (= Γ 287),

ἐκδοτε, καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν ἣν τιν' ἔοικεν,
ἣ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται,

is said by Professor Goodwin, M. T. § 568, to be the only case of the relative with the subjunctive without *κε* in such sentences in Homer. The exact force of the mode in this example is hard to determine, and I am willing, so far as our argument is concerned, that it should be classed as final.

We may even grant the case σ 334, placed under this head by Delbrück and Monro,

μή τίς τοι τάχα Ἴρου ἀμείνων ἄλλος ἀναστή,
ὅς τίς σ' ἀμφὶ κάρη κεκοπῶς χερσὶ στιβαρήσιν
δώματος ἐκπέμψῃσι φορύξας αἵματι πολλῷ,

though it is possible that the relative clause is only a continuation of the expression of warning ("look to it that another does not arise and"), or that it is only an expression of expectation without ἄν¹ (so Ameis-Hentze). But, even if these cases are sound, they are but two² against a very large number.

Now if the construction under examination were a development from the relative clause of purpose, it would do one of three things. It would, in conformity with ordinary Attic usage, appear with the future indicative for its mode; or it would appear with the indicative in some examples and the subjunctive with ἄν or κε in others; or, at the extreme, it would appear with the future indicative in some examples, the subjunctive with ἄν or κε in some others, and, just conceivably in a very small proportion of cases, with the subjunctive without ἄν or κε. Instead, however, of doing any of these things, it appears in every case with the subjunctive, and, in no case that properly belongs under the head which we are considering, with ἄν or κε. This state of affairs would, humanly speaking, be impossible if the construction had originated in a clause of purpose, whereas it is precisely what is to be expected if the clause originated in a deliberative subjunctive.

It remains to speak of the one case which Mr. Earle adduces that does not properly fall under the present head. In this example, which is from Hesiod Op. 57 (δώσω κακὸν ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες | τέρπωνται), not only is the introductory expression different from any that we have seen, but the dependent clause contains a κεν. These two facts sever it

¹ See a similar subjunctive *with* κεν, in δ 754, p. 170, below.

² I see no sufficient reason for regarding the verb in *old* τις . . . θανμάσσεται in Σ 467 as a subjunctive, as Monro is inclined to do.

from all the other examples, and reduce it to the ordinary construction of the earlier clause of purpose, as commonly treated. Out of such cases as this, had they occurred frequently, a construction similar to that which has been under discussion, only *with* ἄν, not without it, might indeed have been developed, but was not. And, if it had been, it would not have been confined within the narrow range to which the Extended Deliberative Subjunctive is confined; nor would it have stopped at the stage of development represented by the subjunctive with ἄν or κε, but, like the construction of purpose itself, would have passed on to the stage seen in the Attic construction with the future indicative.

These objections were urged by myself in a discussion which took place at the meeting of the American Philological Association in the summer of 1892, at the conclusion of the reading of Mr. Earle's "Notes on the Subjunctive of Purpose in Relative Clauses in Greek." Mr. Earle's paper was printed in abstract in the Proceedings for that year. One phrase in it, in the form in which it was published, seems to point to a conceivable means of escape from the argument which I have given. For this reason, and also because the paper gives a clearer idea of Mr. Earle's conception of the prototype of the Attic idiom than did his article in the Classical Review, I reprint it here in full.

The paper contained an examination of the idiom οὐκ ἔστι (μοι), or οὐκ ἔχω, ὅς (ὅστις or rel. adv.) and subj. (or opt. aft. secondary tense). The prototype of the Attic idiom was sought in Homeric Greek: cf. *Il.* 21, 111 sqq., *Il.* 19, 355-7, *Il.* 6, 450 sqq., *Il.* 4, 164, *Il.* 21, 103 sq., *Od.* 6, 201 sqq., *Il.* 3, 459 sq., *Od.* 15, 310 sq., with *Soph. Ai.* 514 sq., *Eur. H. F.* 1245, *Xen. Anab.* 1. 7, 7, *Eur. Or.* 722 sq. (For other examples from Attic Greek, see *Class. Rev.* Vol. VI, pp. 93-5.) It was suggested that "the gradual obsolescence of the subjunctive which can be traced in Ionic and Attic Greek, in what Weber calls 'unvollständige Finalsätze' with ὅπως, seems to have gone hand in hand with a similar obsolescence in the kindred relative final-clauses" (*i.e.* relative in the more restricted sense). In this process the finite construction of the rel. clause may have been influenced by the use of the fut. particip. to express purpose after verbs of motion, a usage so extensive in Ionic Greek that in *Hdt.* viii-ix, which, according to my examination, contain *not a single fut. rel. clause of purpose*, and no certain instance of the οὐκ ἔχω, ὅστις constr. with (so-called) final subjunct., we find the fut. part. in all 17 times. — "In such a sweeping away of the subjunctive constr. we must seek an

explanation of a survival as certain as the $\text{o}\nu\kappa \xi\chi\omega \delta\tau\iota$ (δ) constr. appears to be, examined from the point of view of historical syntax. It is here that Goodwin's remark is suggestive. If, instead of saying that the construction in question 'may be *explained* by the analogy of' the indirect deliberative, we say that it is to be *explained* from the essential nature of the subjunctive, traced in its development in Homer, and found again, in perhaps still further development, in Attic Greek, as a survival, sometimes obscured and confused by the indirect deliberative, the similar form of which served to prevent it from sharing the fate of its companion relative clauses of purpose. If we put the case in this form (pointing out in our support the triple ambiguity of $\xi\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ and the ambiguity of $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$), we shall, it seems to me, be as near the truth as we are likely to get in so subtle a matter."

[The writer did not make himself responsible for any particular theory of the original meaning of the Greek subjunctive. He does not, however, wish himself to be considered as favoring the putting on the same footing, though they may both for convenience' sake be classed as "final," such subjunctives as those which are discussed above, and the final subjunctive developed from the independent *hortatory* subjunctive.¹ Cf. Eur. Suppl. 1232, with Soph. Antig. 1332 sq., 1184 sq.]

From the fact that Mr. Earle printed his paper, it is to be presumed that, in spite of the evidence pointed out, in our oral discussion, as afforded by the absence of $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$, he continued to hold his opinion. If that is so, there are but two forms in which it would be conceivably possible to hold it. These would be somewhat as follows: (1) The construction in question was originally expressed by the bare subjunctive, at a time (this must have been well back of the Homeric age; yet no example occurs in Homer) when the bare subjunctive was the form employed in the relative clause of purpose; but, while other clauses of purpose passed on to the stage at which $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ was used, and then to the stage in which the future indicative was used, these particular clauses were held to their earliest form by their close resemblance to the indirect deliberative question; or (2) the construction began at a time when the relative clause of purpose took the subjunctive *with* $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$, but, when this

¹ I have endeavored to prove, in a paper printed in abstract in the Proceedings of the American Philological Association for 1892, that the subjunctive with $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon$ in the relative final clause is not of "hortatory" origin, but expressed originally simply something reckoned upon ("future" or "prospective" subjunctive). This view, though not the one put forth by Delbrück, seems to me to be necessary, and also to have the distinct merit of bridging the chasm which would otherwise exist between the Homeric idiom and the Attic.

clause passed on to the stage in which the future indicative was employed, it remained in the subjunctive, and also shook off its *ἄν* or *κε*, on account of its close resemblance to the indirect deliberative question. In either case, Mr. Earle's phrase ought not to be "sometimes obscured and confused by the indirect deliberative," but "completely obscured and overpowered by the indirect deliberative." The phrase, however, is unimportant. What is important is that to grant either of these alternatives is to grant a closer resemblance between our examples and the indirect deliberative than between our examples and the clause of purpose; and to do this is to surrender the case entirely.

The passage in brackets in Mr. Earle's paper might perhaps at first sight appear to undo my objection to his theory, inasmuch as he would not speak of the prototype of the construction as being strictly "final." It becomes necessary, then, to examine the examples which he cites from Homer, to see what is the concrete starting-point which he has in mind. They are here presented in an order intended to show their relationship; and I add several (marked by the word "additional") for further illustration.

A.

ἀλλά μοι εὔ θ' ὑπόθεν καὶ ἄμ' ἡγεμόν' ἐσθλὸν ὅπασσον,
ὅς κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη. — ο 310.

ADDITIONAL.

ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι δότε νῆα θοὴν καὶ εἵκοσ' ἐταίρους,
οἳ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσωσι κέλευθον. — B 212.

B.

ADDITIONAL.

κείνος δ' αὖ περὶ κῆρι μακάρτατος ἔξοχον ἄλλων,
ὅς κέ σ' ἐέννοισι βρίσας οἰκόνδ' ἀγάγηται. — ζ 158.

ADDITIONAL.

ἔσται μάν, ὅτ' ἂν αὐτε φίλην γλαυκώπιδα εἴπη. — Θ 373.

ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐνμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο,
Ζεὺς δέ σφι Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων,
αὐτὸς ἐπισσειήσιν ἐρεμνὴν αἰγίδα πᾶσιν
τῇσδ' ἀπάτης κοτέων. τὰ μὲν ἔσσεται οὐκ ἀτέλεστα.

— Δ 164.

ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐνμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο. — Ζ 448.

οὐχ ὀράας, οἷος καὶ ἐγὼ καλὸς τε μέγας τε ;
πατὴρ δ' εἰμ' ἀγαθοῖο, θεὰ δέ με γείνατο μήτηρ·
ἀλλ' ἐπι τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταίη.
ἔσσεται ἡ ἥως ἡ δεῖλη ἡ μέσον ἡμαρ,
ὅππότε τις καὶ ἐμεῖο Ἄρει ἐκ θυμὸν ἔλῃται,
ἡ ὅ γε δουρὶ βαλὼν ἡ ἀπὸ νευρῆφιν οἴστω. — Φ 108.

C.

στῆτέ μοι, ἀμφίπολοι· πόσε φεύγετε φῶτα ἰδοῦσαι ;
ἡ μή πού τινα δυσμενέων φάσθ' ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν ;
οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ διερὸς βροτός, οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς κεν Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐς γαίαν ἵκηται
δηιοτῆτα φέρων· μάλα γὰρ φίλοι ἀθανάτοισιν. — ζ 199.

οὐ γὰρ οἶω

πάγχυ θεοῖς μακάρεσσι γονὴν Ἀρκεισιάδαο
ἔχθεσθ', ἀλλ' ἔτι πού τις ἐπέσσεται, ὅς κεν ἔχῃσιν
δῶματά θ' ὑψερεφέα καὶ ἀπόπροθι πίονας ἀγρούς.

— δ 754.

ADDITIONAL.

εἰ γάρ κ' ἐν νύσση γε παρεξέλασθησθα διώκων,
οὐκ ἔσθ', ὅς κέ σ' ἔλῃσι μετάλμενος οὐδὲ παρέλθῃ,
οὐδ' εἴ κεν μετόπισθεν Ἀρείονα δῖον ἐλαύνῃ. — Ψ 344.

ADDITIONAL.

κούρῃ Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρον Πηνελόπεια,
θάρσει, μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῇσι μελόντων.
οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ, οὐδ' ἔσσεται, οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῶ νιέει χεῖρας ἐποίσει
ζῶοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο. — π 435.

ADDITIONAL.

οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ὃς πάροιθ' αἰρήσεται
τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύναμιν ἀντ' Εὐρυσθέως.

—Eur. Heracleid. 57.

D.

ὥς ἄρα μιν Πριάμοιο προσηύδα φαίδιμος υἱός
λίσσόμενος ἐπέεσσιν, ἀμείλικτον δ' ὅπ' ἄκουσεν·
νήπιε, μή μοι ἄποινα πιφαύσκειο μηδ' ἀγόρευε·
πρὶν μὲν γὰρ Πάτροκλον ἐπισπεῖν αἴσιμον ἡμαρ,
τόφρα τί μοι πεφιδέσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φίλτερον ἦεν
Τρώων, καὶ πολλοὺς ζωοὺς ἔλον ἡδὲ πέρασσα·
νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔσθ', ὅς τις θάνατον φύγη, ὅν κε θεός γε
Ἴλίου προπάροιθεν ἐμῆς ἐν χερσὶ βάλῃσιν,
καὶ πάντων Τρώων, πέρι δ' αὖ Πριάμοιό γε παίδων.

—Φ 97.

E.

ὕμεις δ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην καὶ κτήμαθ' ἅμ' αὐτῇ
ἔκδοτε, καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν, ἣν τιν' ἔοικεν,
ἣ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται.—Γ 458.

The examples in group A convey "purpose" in the ordinary full sense of the grammatical term (being expressible in Attic by the relative with the future indicative), and thereby differ radically in force, as well as in form (namely, in being accompanied by *κεν*) and in the nature of the words which they follow, from the idiom we are studying.

The examples in group B are all simply prophetic in meaning ("happy is he that shall . . .," "the day will come when . . . shall"), which characteristic is wholly absent from the idiom we are studying. In one example only, Φ 111, is *ἄν* or *κε* wanting, and — to say nothing of the necessities of the meaning — the presence of *ἄν* in the parallel passages, Θ 373, Δ 164, and Z 448, shows that the subjunctive here is of the same nature as in the rest.

In group C we get examples the first of which, but for the presence of *ἄν* or *κε*, would seem at first glance to be parallel

to those we are investigating. But the resemblance is purely superficial. In the idiom which we are studying, the prevailing type of the earlier examples is the negation of the existence, or the assertion of the restriction of the existence, of a means for carrying out an act which the speaker wills. "I must escape this suffering — there is no means," "I must look to some one — there is none but you," "I must escape death — there is no hope," — such is the cast of all the examples before Xenophon, excepting two only, namely, the second one from Euripides, and the one from Aristophanes. In the former, the idea of impossibility, which in other examples has been present by inference, is the sole idea conveyed. The later growth of the construction *might have* proceeded along this line; but it did not. The construction broadens in scope, in that it comes to be used with the third person as well as with the first, in this case having the power of expressing an act willed by a third person, not by the speaker. In the case of the example Eq. 1321, too, the will expressed is not that of the speaker, but is an echo of a command just given by the person addressed. But here and elsewhere, in all the examples that have thus far appeared, saving only the second from Euripides, the idea of *will*, of *demand*, of *aim*, is always present. The latter example, then, represents merely a quickly arrested side-growth, and the typical construction may be described as involving the expression of the will of the speaker himself or of the subject of the main sentence. Now in the subjunctive examples under C (to say nothing of the presence of *κεν*), the act of the verb is not willed by any one; while, on the other hand, the indicative example which I have added shows how different the after-fate of this construction is from that of the one which we are studying.

The example under D differs from those under C in that the element of will does appear. Achilles says, in answer to Lycaon's prayer for mercy, "there is no man that shall escape," or, in substance, "it is my will that no man shall escape." But this does not correspond to the examples of our idiom. Orestes, in the example from Euripides, Or. 722, does not mean "it is my will that I shall not escape

death." Achilles denies the existence of any such impulse as is suggested in *φύγη*. Orestes expresses, in *φύγω*, the actual existence of an impulse, and denies only the existence of a means for carrying it out.

As for the example under E, though I have already expressed myself as ready to concede it, so far as our present argument is concerned, as a final clause, I should not be able to follow the thought of any one who found a closer resemblance between such a sentence and *οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω* than between the latter and *οὐκ ἀπορῶ δι' ἣντινα πρόφασιν λέγω*, or between such a sentence and *οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω* than between the latter and *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω*.

As for the phrase "the gradual obsolescence of the subjunctive . . . in the kindred relative final-clauses," as Mr. Earle puts it, I should like to suggest the greater accuracy of some less mechanical phrase, such as "the completion of the passage of the form from the older expression of futurity to the newer, of which hints had already been given in Homer." And as for the phrase "examined from the point of view of historical syntax," — a phrase in itself calculated to array all good men on the side of the theory of which it is used, — it seems to me simply out of place. The one thing that has been lacking has been a rigorous examination of the question from precisely this point of view.

Next, — for the question involves details that call for great patience, — I have to add several examples confirmatory of the theory of the existence of an Extended Deliberative, and to discuss a part of them.

The following from Gothic and Old English, which I owe to my colleague, Professor Blackburn, illustrate incontestably the subordination of a deliberative. The connectives are still interrogatives; for, at this early date, *hwa* had not yet taken upon itself the relative function. In the case of the example from Old English, it might possibly be urged that the form of the Greek has been retained, and that the meaning of *οὐκ ἔχουσιν* is "they know not," but a similar explanation would hardly be reasonable in the case of the example from Beowulf.

And hig nabbaþ hwæt hig eton. — Matth. 15, 32. (Greek οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί φάγωσιν, Vulg. et non habent quod manducent.)

Nah hwa sweord wege. — Beowulf, 2252 (3). (=non habeo quis ensem ferat.)¹

The following has not appeared in the controversy :

ἄλλον δ' οὐ τευ οἶδα, τεῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω. — Σ 192.²

If sound, it is of great importance, as proving, of itself alone, the interrogative origin of our idiom. But the presence of ἄν is unexpected, and this fact, together with the use of the interrogative, might be thought to throw suspicion upon the state of the text. What we ought to think upon this point will best appear in connection with the discussion of certain examples of a type οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως with the future indicative, — at first sight identical in form, except for the mode, with the extended deliberative, — which still demand consideration.

In two of the groups below I add, for further light, examples with other tenses of the indicative.

A.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ὄψει σὺ δεῦρ' ἐλθόντα με. — Soph. Ant. 329.

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦθ', ὅπως ἐγὼ λαβὼν
σημεῖα τοιαῦτ', οὐ φανῶ τοῦμὸν γένος. — Soph. O. T. 1058.

τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ποτ' εἰς ἐμέ
τοῦννεδος ἔξεις ἐνδίκως ὀνειδίσαι. — Soph. Phil. 522.

οὐ γάρ τις ἔστιν ὃς πάροιθ' αἰρήσεται
τὴν σὴν ἀχρεῖον δύναμιν ἀντ' Εὐρυσθέως. — Eur. Heracl. 57.

οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτῳ φθονήσουσι,
πάντων ὡς οἶόν τ' ἐστί τὰ βέλτιστα πράττουσιν. — Isocr. 3. 18.

¹ The resemblance of the Greek idiom to such examples as nec quid speraret habebat, Verg. Ecl. 2, 2, nil habeo quod agam, Hor. Sat. 1, 9, 19, is obvious, and suggests an interesting question of parallel growth or imitation.

² La Roche, Düntzer, Ameis-Hentze, and Nauck all give the verse as it is here printed, though various ways of substituting a relative for the interrogative τεῦ have been suggested.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου
λόγων ἀκούσαι ζῶν ποτ' ἠθέλησ' ἐμῶν. — Soph. Ai. 1069.

B.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως πόλιν
κείνην ἐρείψεις. — Soph. O. C. 1372.

ταύτην ποτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς.

— Soph. Ant. 750.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου μ' ὀλεῖς. — Soph. O. T. 448.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ εἰ σὺ γεννάδας ἀνήρ. — Ar. Ran. 640.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως
ᾧδ' οὐκ Ὀρέστης ἔσθ' ὁ προσφωνῶν ἐμέ. — Soph. El. 1479.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ πιστὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν πτερόν
ἐξήγαγ' ἐς τόδ' ἄλσος. — Soph. O. C. 97.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἐν τινι μικρῷ
δέσποινα χόλον καταπαύσει. — Eur. Med. 171.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνὺς γυνή
ἔτλη ποθ'. — Eur. Med. 1339.

C.

οὐκ ἔστιν αἴκισμ' οὐδὲ μηχανήμ' ὅτῳ
προτρέψεταιί με Ζεὺς γεγωνήσαι τάδε,
πρὶν ἂν χαλασθῇ δεσμὰ λυμαντήρια. — Aesch. P. V. 989.

D.

νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας στόλος, οὐδ' ἐνι
φροντίδος ἔγχος
ᾧ τις ἀλέγεται. — Soph. O. T. 168.

ταύτη πελάζει ναυβάτης οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν ·
οὐ γάρ τις ὕρμος ἔστιν, οὐδ' ὅποι πλέων
ἐξεμπολήσει κέρδος, ἢ ξενώσεται. — Soph. Phil. 301.

ψευδωνύμως σε δαίμονες Προμηθέα
καλοῦσιν · αὐτὸν γάρ σε δεῖ προμηθέως
ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τῆσδ' ἐκκυλισθήσει τύχης. — Aesch. P. V. 85.

In the examples with the future indicative in the first three groups of clauses, the mechanism is simply a negated *statement* with regard to futurity. The evidence of this is to be seen in some of the examples, otherwise of the same nature, in which a negated statement for the present or past is used, as in the last under A ("there is no point in which in life he was ever willing to listen to my words"), or as in El. 1480 under B ("there is no way in which this is not Orestes"). In no example is there that feeling of demand which we found to be characteristic of the extended deliberative, and to be present in every example of that idiom excepting one. Even in the sentence from Isocrates under A, which might at first sight (especially if one translated by the phrase "having no one to envy") appear to resemble the subjunctive idiom, this element is lacking, since the meaning appears to be simply "there being no one whose station in life will (=is of a kind to) lead to envy."¹

Under this general identity of mechanism, however, the three groups differ in that the first expresses only an unshaded statement of expected future or actual present or past fact ("you will not see me coming hither again"), while the second expresses impossibility ("you cannot take the city"), and the third expresses resolve ("Zeus shall never force me to utter this" — the cry of the speaker as he steels himself against yielding. Cf. the resolve of Achilles expressed in the independent indicative in A 88: οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο | σοὶ κοίλης παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐπόσει | συμπάντων Δαναῶν).

The examples under D (doubtless many more remain to be noticed) clearly differ from those printed above them in that they do express an act demanded by some one. They are therefore identical in character with the examples of the Extended Deliberative, and might equally well be written with the subjunctive. On the other hand, they are precisely such

¹ If any, however, take a different view of this example, they will properly regard it as an instance of a side-branch from the idiom seen under D, bearing the same relation to that idiom which the example from Euripides bore to all the other examples of the extended deliberative.

examples as one would expect to find if one had information that the Greek *had* developed an extended clause of purpose of the class to which Mr. Earle and J. D. supposed the subjunctive examples to belong.

That such a development is antecedently perfectly possible I have already said. But so is also a development from the deliberative future indicative, parallel to that of the subjunctive examples from the deliberative subjunctive. Examples of the independent deliberative future indicative, as in Aesch. Ag. 1362 and 1367, are common enough. But examples are not rare of the dependent clause, as in Soph. O. C. 1742 (*ὅπως μολούμεθ' ἐς δόμους | οὐκ ἔχω*), Theocr. 16, 16 (*πόθεν οἴσεται ἀθρεῖ | ἄργυρον*), and 17, 10 (*παπταίνει . . . πόθεν ἄρξεται ἔργου*), and Plat. Gorg. 521 B (*οὐκ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς*. Cf. the corresponding subjunctive in Rep. 368 B, *ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι*, and Euthyd. 287 C, *οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι*). As there is a simple dependent deliberative future indicative, so there might also be an extended deliberative of the same mode and tense.

Which of these two possible origins is the real one? I see no means of reaching an absolute decision. Probability, however, appears to point to the second rather than to the first. In the case of the subjunctive idiom we have found positive evidence for belief in a deliberative origin. Unless there is positive evidence forthcoming for a different origin in the case of the indicative idiom, it will be sound method not to assign it to a different cause. The Greek consciousness of the kinship of the force of the *subjunctive* idiom with that of the deliberative subjunctive has kept the mode, in spite of the approach of the meaning toward that of purpose, from passing over into the mode of purpose, and has kept the formula very nearly confined to the expression of the existence or non-existence of a difficulty. Within this range of meaning, then, within which our indicative examples also are confined, the Greek feeling for the quasi-deliberative form was clearly stronger than for the quasi-final form, and the Greek mind is likely, therefore, in using an indicative, to have fallen upon the practically identical deliberative idiom rather than

upon the idiom of the final clause. In default, then, of outside evidence for the final clause, — which, up to the present time, I have not found, — I should regard the whole group of phenomena, subjunctive and indicative alike, as of deliberative origin.¹

The examples of the unquestionable dependent deliberative indicative which in this last discussion we have seen (p. 177) bear upon the question of the genuineness of the dependent τεῦ ἄν . . . δύω in Homer Σ 192. The subjunctive with ἄν or κε is, in most idioms, either a forerunner of, or an ever-possible substitute for, the future indicative. Even, then, if no other examples of the dependent deliberative subjunctive with ἄν or κε appeared, this example should not surprise us. But other cases do appear, as in N 741, ἐνθεν δ' ἄν μάλα πᾶσαν ἐπιφρασσαίμεθα βουλήν, | ἥ κε ἐνὶ νήεσσι πολυκλήισι πέσσωμεν, | αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσι θεὸς δόμεναι κράτος, ἥ κε ἐπειτα | παρ νηῶν ἔλθωμεν ἀπήμονες, and I 618, ἄμα δ' ἡοὶ φαινομένηφιν | φρασσόμεθ', ἥ κε νεώμεθ' ἐφ' ἡμέτερ', ἥ κε μένωμεν. (Cf. Δ 14, where ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα after φραζόμεθ' is shown by the context to mean "how these things shall be," not "how they will be," and therefore forms the connecting link with the dependent deliberative indicative as seen in Attic.)²

The text in Σ 192 is therefore not invalidated by the employment of κε. Nor is it invalidated by the use of the interrogative τεῦ, since such a cast of the sentence, seen already above in the case of Old English, forms precisely the first stage which one must assume for the development of the Greek idiom with the bare subjunctive, which, on independent grounds, we have found to be an extended deliberative. The text is therefore sound, and adds strength to a case already strong.

¹ Cobet, *Collectanea Critica*, p. 137, takes the dependent clause in Aesch. P. V. 85, above, as equalling *quo facto* . . ., probably having in mind the interrogative force. Dindorf, *Lex. Aeschyleum*, s.v. *δοῖς*, uses the phrase "in interrogatione indirecta" in citing the same passage.

² The general view is that the deliberative subjunctive with ἄν does not occur in Attic. So Bäumlein, *Untersuchungen*, p. 184, and Kühner, *Gr. Gramm.* § 394, Anm. 4.

I regard the evidence, then, as being conclusive in favor of the view held substantially in common by Goodwin, Jebb, Tarbell, Verrall (by implication from his note upon Aesch. Ag. 620), and Sidgwick, against the view of Monro, Earle, and "J. D."

Monro's view appears only in the sentence already quoted. The views of Sidgwick and J. D. appear only incidentally, and without argument, in their discussion of the optative idiom, and will therefore require no separate consideration.

II.

The certainty which has apparently been reached with regard to the history of the subjunctive idiom does not extend to the history of the optative idiom seen in *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*, etc., to which we now pass. The result of our examination will be, I think, the disproof, in any case and finally, of one of the two contending views. The other view will be shown to have strong arguments in its favor, but a certain difficulty—not necessarily finally insoluble—will still remain.

Madvig appears not to discuss the optative idiom. Krüger (II. § 54, 3, 8) assumes the omission of *ἄν* in eight examples from the Attic stage (see also I. § 54, 14, A. 4). G. Wolff (Rh. M. 1863, pp. 602–6) inclines to emend all independent examples by inserting *ἄν* or reading a subjunctive. Goodwin (M. and T. § 50, 2, N. 1, of the editions between 1860 and 1890, and § 241 of the new edition) regards the dependent examples as "conditionals" or "potentials" without *ἄν*; and this was the generally accepted theory, down to the year 1881.

The participants in the debate which began with that year have been Mr. Sidgwick, Professor Jebb (in his note on Soph. O. C. 170, and Appendix I.), Mr. Verrall (in his note on Aesch. Ag. 620), Mr. Jerram (in the note on v. 52 in his edition of the *Alcestis* of Euripides), Mr. Earle (*Classical Review* for March, 1892), and a writer in the same journal signing the initials J. D. to articles in the numbers for December, 1892, and March, 1893. Professor Wecklein has also expressed his

opinion in a review of Mr. Sidgwick's Choephoroi in the Berl. Phil. Wochenschr. for 1885, p. 487 seq., and, incidentally, in the Jahresbericht LXXI. (1892), p. 181.

Mr. Sidgwick's views were first put forth in his school editions of the Agamemnon (1881) and the Choephoroi (1884), Appendix I. The substance of them may be seen in the following passages, which in substance are common to both books :

"Now, it must be plain, considering these examples all in a lump, that what they *vary from* is not the optative with *ἄν*, but the interrogative subjunctive, or, as it is usually called, the *deliberative*. The subjunctive might be substituted for the optative in all these instances : and in the first two it is usually so read, though against the best MS. authority.

The difficulty then is this : not why *ἄν* is omitted, for the sentences are not conditional ; but why the *remote* form [optative] is used instead of the *primary* form [subjunctive], when the sentences are all of a *primary* character.

The answer is that the optative expresses the remoteness, not as usual [*e.g.* in past final, or past indefinite, or past deliberatives] of *pastness*, but of possibility : the instinct is to express by optative something *more out of the question* than the subjunctive would have expressed.

Thus, *e.g.*, in the third instance *τίς κατάσχη* ; (see p. 182) would be good Greek, but the question of restraining Zeus' omnipotence would seem to be more treated as a practical one : the optative puts it further off, as a wild impossibility.

Or again, in Ar. Plut. 438 *ποῖ φύγη* would be in ordinary circumstances the expression, and so the older editors all read it : but *φύγοι*, the MS. reading, and the right one, is the exclamation of supreme terror, treating escape as in the last degree unlikely."

The examples cited by Mr. Sidgwick in these appendices were from Attic poetry, with the exception of two from Plato. In the appendix to his edition of the Oedipus Coloneus (first published in 1885), Professor Jebb expresses his agreement with Mr. Sidgwick's main point, but very carefully sifts the alleged examples. In Soph. O. C. 170 he would read

ἐλθῇ, and in Ar. Plut. 438 φύγῃ, on the ground that the apparent meaning demands the subjunctive. In the case of most of the examples which he cites from Attic prose (Lys. 31, 24, Dem. 21, 35, Plat. Gorg. 492 B, Euthyd. 296 E, Antiph. 1, 4) he points out an easy way in which ἄν might have accidentally dropped out, and expresses himself as inclined to adopt the theory of such a loss in the case of all the examples.

Mr. Verrall, in his edition of the Agamemnon, 1889, accepts Mr. Sidgwick's view (see ad v. 625), as does also Mr. Jerram, in his edition of the Alcestis of Euripides, in the following note, ad v. 52: "For μόλοι, the opt., we should expect μόλῃ, the subj., after the primary tense οὐκ ἔστι. But the optative is used to express something farther removed from possibility, 'Is there absolutely no chance, etc.?' "

The next reference to the matter is at the conclusion of Mr. Earle's article in the Classical Review for March, 1892, in these words: "If the MSS. are to be trusted, we sometimes have the optative of purpose, instead of the subjunctive, after primary tenses. Cf. Eur. Alc. 112, Aesch. Prom. 291, Ch. 72." In the Jahresbericht of the same year (loc. cit.), Professor Wecklein incidentally again expressed the belief which he had expressed before in the review already referred to, that the constructions in dispute were potentials. In the Classical Review for December, 1892, J. D. argued the case against Mr. Sidgwick's remote deliberative and for the potential. Mr. Sidgwick replied in the March number for 1893, holding to his view with regard to the examples from the Attic playwrights, but adding that Professor Jebb had convinced him that the prose examples ought to be given up, on the ground that "the omission of ἄν is much more likely to be an oversight of the scribe in these cases." To some of the objections which in this article Mr. Sidgwick urged against J. D.'s view, the latter made answer in the Classical Review for October, 1893, and Mr. Sidgwick, having seen the article in proof, added a few comments.

Before we can proceed to weigh the arguments which have been put forward in this discussion, it is necessary to have before us, in classified form, all the examples that have thus

far been produced. I add a considerable context in the cases in which the exact shade of meaning might otherwise not be clear :

The Independent Construction.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ τρέφει
 δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχρη,
 πόντιαί τ' ἀγκάλαι κνωδάλων
 ἀνταίων βροτοῖσι
 πλάθουσι · βλαστοῦσι καὶ πεδαίχμιοι
 λαμπάδες πεδάοροι
 πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβά-
 μονα κἀνεμοέντ' ἄν¹
 αἰγίδων φράσαι κότον ·
 ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι
 καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶ τλημόνων
 παντόλμους ἔρωτας
 ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν ; — Aesch. Cho. 585.

τεᾶν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν
 ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι ;
 τὰν οὔθ' ὕπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ πάντ' ἀγρεύων²
 οὔτε θεῶν ἄκματοι μῆνες, ἀγήρως δὲ χρόνῳ
 δυνάστας κατέχεις Ὀλύμπου μαρμαρόεσσαν αἶγλαν.
 — Soph. Ant. 604.

ΧΟ. τῶν, ξένε πάμμορ', εὖ φύλαξαι,
 μετάσταθ', ἀπόβαθι. πολ-
 λὰ κέλευθος ἐρατύει ·
 κλύεις, ὦ πολύμοχθ' ἀλᾶτα ;
 λόγον εἴ τιν' οἴσεις
 πρὸς ἐμὰν λέσχαν, ἀβάτων ἀποβάς,
 ἵνα πᾶσι νόμος,
 φώνει · πρόσθεν δ' ἀπερύκου.

ΟΙ. θύγατερ, ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι ;

ΑΝ. ὦ πάτερ, ἀστοῖς ἴσα χρή μελετᾶν,
 εἴκοντας ἃ δεῖ κακούνοντας.

¹ Codd. κἀνεμοέντων. The gender of αἰγίδων compels emendation.

² Jebb's reading.

ΟΙ. πρόσθιγέ νύν μου. — Soph. O. C. 161.¹

ἄναξ Ἐπολλον καὶ θεοὶ, ποῖ τις φύγοι ;

— Ar. Plut. 438.¹

καὶ τί φίλος ῥέξαιμι ; γάμοι πλήθουσιν ἀνίας.

— Theocr. 27, 24.²

The Dependent Construction.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ

ἐς τὸν πολλὸν φίλοισι καρποῦσθαι χρόνον.

— Aesch. Ag. 620.

ταῖς σαῖς δὲ τύχαις, ἴσθι, συναλγῶ·

τό τε γάρ με, δοκῶ, συγγενὲς οὕτως

ἐσαναγκάζει,

χωρὶς τε γένους οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτφ

μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαιμ' ἢ σοί. — Aesch. P. V. 288.

ΧΟ. πῶς οὖν παλαιὰ παρὰ νεωτέρας μάθω ;

ΗΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐνὸς κείραιτό νιν.

— Aesch. Cho. 171.

ΟΙ. τίς δῆτ' ἂν εἴη τήνδ' ὁ προσθακῶν ἔδραν ;

ΘΗ. ὅρα κατ' Ἄργος εἴ τις ὑμῖν ἐγγενής

ἔσθ', ὅστις ἂν σου τοῦτο προσχρήζοι τυχεῖν.

ΟΙ. ὦ φίλτατε, σχὲς οὐπερ εἰ. ΘΗ. τί δ' ἔστι σοι ;

ΟΙ. μή μου δεηθῆς. ΘΗ. πράγματος ποίου ; λέγε.

ΟΙ. ἔξοιδ' ἀκούων τῶνδ' ὅς ἐσθ' ὁ προστάτης.

ΘΗ. καὶ τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι ;

ΟΙ. παῖς οὐμός, ὠναξ, στυγνός, οὗ λόγων ἐγὼ

ἄλγιστ' ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἐξασχοίμην κλύων.

ΘΗ. τί δ' ; οὐκ ἀκούειν ἔστι, καὶ μὴ δρᾶν ἂ μὴ

χρήζεις ; τί σοι τοῦδ' ἔστι λυπηρὸν κλύειν ;

— Soph. O. C. 1166.

¹ I agree with Jebb that the general character of these two passages (the first is sufficiently shown here) demands the subjunctive.

² This example was added by J. D., but is not included in Mr. Sidgwick's latest list, *Classical Review*, March, 1893.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ναυκληρίαν
 ἔσθ' ὅποι τις αἶας
 στείλας ἢ Λυκίας
 εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνύδρους
 Ἀμμωνίδας ἔδρας
 δυστάνου παραλύσαι
 ψυχάν· — Eur. Alc. 112.¹

ΑΠ. λαβὼν ἴθ'· οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πείσαιμί σε.

ΘΑ. κτείνειν ὃν ἂν χρῇ; τοῦτο γὰρ τετάγμεθα.

ΑΠ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέλλουσι θάνατον ἐμβαλεῖν.

ΘΑ. ἔχω λόγον δὴ καὶ προθυμίαν σέθεν.

ΑΠ. ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἀλκηστis ἐς γῆρας μόλοι;

ΘΑ. οὐκ ἔστι· τιμαῖς καμὲ τέρπεσθαι δόκει.

ΑΠ. οὔτοι πλέον γ' ἂν ἡ μίαν ψυχὴν λάβοις.

ΘΑ. νέων φθινόντων μείζον ἄρνημαι γέρας. — Eur. Alc. 48.

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρυμνῶν δωμάτων ἔχει κράτος,
 ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο ποντίῳ σάλῳ
 κάμνοντας ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ ναυαγίαις;

— Ar. Thesm. 871.

The following, which has not before appeared in the controversy, is thus given by Dindorf :

ἔσθ' ὅπως ἀνευ μάχης καὶ τῆς κατοξείας βοῆς
 ἐς λόγους ἔλθοιμεν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ διαλλαγῇ;

— Ar. Vesp. 471.²

Mr. Earle's theory, it seems to me, may be briefly dismissed. Something approaching purpose (though still clearly differing from it) might be felt in the case of Alc. 112, but in P. V. 288 it would appear a palpable forcing to render by any phraseology remotely resembling such a form as "no one

¹ Not given by Mr. Sidgwick. Theogn. 382 is probably intentionally omitted by him, together with Homeric clauses with *ὅς*, as too early. — Suppl. 20, Phil. 895, Plut. 374, and Av. 172, once read without *ἄν*, are now generally emended.

² V. alone, according to Dindorf, has *ἐλθοιμεν*, the rest of the Codd. having *ἐλθωμεν*. (Liddell and Scott, under *ὅπως*, have inadvertently cited the passage with both readings.) The subjunctive is impossible, making a sentence unlike any that we have seen in Part I. The only question, then, is whether we ought, with Hermann, to amend *ἀνευ* to *ἄν ἐκ*.

exists for the purpose of, with a view to, my paying him greater honor than I pay you." Mr. Earle's view seems to owe its origin to a desire to find a relationship between the optative construction and the subjunctive construction, which latter he has treated as final. If that view falls, as in Part I. I have tried to show that it must, Mr. Earle's probably strongest reason for his explanation of the optative falls with it. It should be added, too, that none of the disputants have agreed with him on this point. J. D., who shares his view of the subjunctive construction, regards the optative construction as potential.

J. D.'s argument upon the optative, as given in the December number, 1892, falls into two parts; *viz.* (1) a special argument, and (2) a canon with application.

The argument is in substance as follows: There is no need of resorting to "a grammatical novelty," since the examples can all be explained as potentials unaccompanied with *ἄν*, such as are frequently found in Pindar and Theocritus (to say nothing of Homer), and occasionally even in Attic (as Aesch. Eum. 265).

The canon, mingled with the application, is contained in the following:

"An oblique question is essentially a question repeated in word or thought; it is therefore necessarily dependent on some verb or verbal substantive implying perception of mind or sense or the outward expression of such perception (*verba sentiendi et declarandi*). In these indirect deliberatives no such introductory statement occurs; neither can it be understood."

Briefly put, the canon would read, as Mr. Earle's canon read (in my version) above: If in a given example the full apparatus and full force of a given known construction do not exist, then the construction found in the example can have no relation with that known construction. This canon, on which I have already commented in criticising Mr. Earle's theory with regard to the subjunctive idiom, would leave us helpless in face of many an idiom in many a language. To say nothing of the *cur*-question of propriety turned relative,

which I have already brought into court, with what heart would one who held such views of method confront a phenomenon like *τί φάγωσιν* in Mark 6, 36: *ἀπόλυσον αὐτούς, ἵνα ἀπελθόντες εἰς τοὺς κύκλῳ ἀγροὺς καὶ κώμας ἀγοράσωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τί φάγωσιν*, — which is after all but a step in advance of the *ποῦ* . . . *κλίνῃ* of Luke 9, 56: *ὁ δὲ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔχει ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν κλίνῃ*?¹

This part of J. D.'s argument, therefore, has in my judgment no weight. If there exists an independent remote deliberative in Greek, then it could readily pass over into a dependent relative form, just as the deliberative subjunctive did.

The other argument of J. D., on the other hand, certainly is sound in form. Whether it is sound in substance or not, I shall attempt later to show.

Before proceeding to the minuter examination of the two important rival theories, it will be well to consider certain fairly evident antecedent objections that have been raised, or might be raised, against one of them.

Against Mr. Sidgwick's theory lies the evident and not inconsiderable objection that the cause invoked by him to explain the phenomena is a cause not known to exist. The only certified optative of remoteness is an optative of the past. While, then, this state of things is not necessarily fatal to the theory, it constitutes a strong objection to it, and a correspondingly strong presumption in favor of any opposing theory which — like that of the potential origin of the idiom — should be based upon known causes.

This objection lies against Mr. Sidgwick's theory in its application both to the independent and to the dependent examples of the idiom. A second difficulty² lies in the

¹ See also in Mark 8, 1 and 2, *μὴ ἐχόντων τί φάγωσιν* and *οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί φάγωσιν*, and in Luke 12, 17, *τί ποιήσω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω ποῦ συνάξω τοὺς καρπούς μου*; I owe these examples to the kindness of my colleague, Professor Burton, who gave them to me in advance of the publication of the new edition of his *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (1893). See § 346, and cf. § 319.

² Though I should class this among the fairly evident antecedent objections to Mr. Sidgwick's theory, it has not been pointed out in print by any one, nor had it occurred to me before it was suggested by Miss C. E. Millerd, in a discussion in my syntactical seminary.

numerical relation between these two classes. Accepting all Mr. Sidgwick's examples of the independent sentences, together with the one added by J. D., we count but five in all, including the rather late one from Theocritus.¹ Of the dependent examples we have found seven or eight. Now the construction of which the subjunctive idiom already discussed is a special extension, *viz.* the independent deliberative, was an idiom in constant use. There are in the literature undoubtedly many hundreds of cases of the independent construction to perhaps two dozen of the extended construction. It is easy to believe in the occasional extension of an idiom repeatedly read in all kinds of literature, and repeatedly heard in daily speech. It is correspondingly difficult to believe in the extension of an idiom found a few times only in a single kind of literature, and never found elsewhere,—and therefore probably never heard in speech. And even if this general difficulty were to be surmounted, it still remains hard to understand why, in the one class of literature in which the constructions do occur, the dependent examples should exceed the independent in number. In order to meet this objection, Mr. Sidgwick will need to shape his theory still further, by seeking for some conception of the peculiar nature of the idea produced by the combination οὐκ ἔσθ' or ἔσθ' with ὅπως, etc.

The minuter examination of the general question will fall under four heads, the first three having to do with the force of the construction, the last with the form: (1) An application to Mr. Sidgwick's view of certain tests suggested by the nature of that view; (2) an application of corresponding tests to the theory that the construction is potential; (3) an examination of the evidence afforded by the contexts of the examples

¹ As already said, I agree with Professor Jebb that two of these examples should be thrown out. And I further agree with Mr. Verrall's recent note on Cho. 593: "As it is possible to supply ἄν from the parallel clause [φράσαι ἄν] preceding, this cannot be counted with certainty among the examples of the simple optative used in this way [for the expression of greater remoteness or impossibility] as a variant for the subjunctive." Cf. the omission under corresponding circumstances in prose, as in Plat. Rep. 352 E. Wecklein regards the explanation as entirely satisfactory.

cited ; (4) the consideration of objections to the solution indicated by evidence reached in (1), (2), and (3).

(1) Mr. Sidgwick's theory that the optative idiom "varies," not from the optative with *ἄν*, but from the subjunctive idiom, and that its difference from the latter lies in its expressing the idea that its contents are "more out of the question," "in the last degree unlikely," "a wild impossibility," must necessarily rest for its support upon the truth of the following tenets: (*a*) This meaning cannot, by the necessary nature of examples cited, be proved to be conveyable by the potential with *ἄν*; (*b*) this meaning *is* proved, by the necessary nature of examples cited, to inhere in the idiom under examination; and (*c*) the differentiation of this idiom from the subjunctive idiom lies only in this one point, the two idioms being otherwise identical in force. These three necessary tenets will be taken up in order.

(*a*) How would the answer to Mr. Sidgwick's *τεὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι* be expressed? Does not a form of expression modelled on Homer's *τέκνα φίλ', ἦ τοι | Ζηνὶ βροτῶν οὐκ ἂν τις ἐρίζοι* (δ 78) and Plato's *οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο* (Phil. 16 B),—namely, the form *οὐδεμία ἂν . . . κατάσχοι*, suffice? If it does, then Mr. Sidgwick's genealogical tree of "grammatical affinities,"—to make use of a very good term of his,—is putting very near relatives asunder. If it does not, would not *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν τις . . . κατάσχοι* suffice? The truth is that the idea of being "more out of the question," "in the last degree unlikely," is to be found in an abundance of potential examples, if one judges them with the same readiness to find the idea with which we approach Mr. Sidgwick's examples. *E.g.* his *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἐνὸς κείραιτό νιν* may be compared with *πλὴν τοῦδ' ἂν οὐδεὶς ἐνδίκως μέμφαιτό μοι*, from v. 63 of the same play. The idea of being out of the question certainly does not more necessarily inhere in *καὶ τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ὅν ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι* (Soph. O. C. 1172) than in *πῶς ἂν τό γ' ἄκου πράγμ' ἂν εἰκότως ψέγοις*; in v. 977 of the same play. And surely nothing could be more "wildly impossible" than the dependent clause in *Æt. Nub. 1181: οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως | μί'*

ἡμέρα γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμέρα δύο, or in Soph. Ant. 911 : μητρός δ' ἐν
 "Αἰδου καὶ πατρός κεκευθότου | οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν
 βλάστοι ποτί.

The meaning which Mr. Sidgwick conceives to be fundamental in our idiom being, then, perfectly conveyable by the potential optative, there must be some grave reason to justify a divorcing of the two, and an attaching of the former to the subjunctive idiom.

(b) Since the differentiation of the optative clauses from the subjunctive is defined as lying in the "wild impossibility" conveyed by the former, the two must of course be understood to be in other respects alike. Let us see whether they are.

In Part I. we have found that, with the exception of the single example Euripides H. F. 1245, which represents an arrested side-growth of the construction, all of the twenty-five subjunctive (or corresponding optative) examples from Classical Greek express an act demanded by the speaker, or by some one else; while the main sentence, if negated, as it is in all the examples down to Aristophanes, expresses the non-existence of a way, a person, etc., for the accomplishment of this demand. The formula for the sentence of the earlier type would then be the following: It is my will (your will, his will, etc.) that a certain thing be done, but there is no way. If, then, the optative idiom differs from the subjunctive as Mr. Sidgwick believes it to differ, and only thus, the meaning of a negative main sentence with attached optative would be expressed by the formula: It is my will (your will, his will, etc.) that a certain thing be done, but there is no *conceivably possible* way. Such an interpretation would fit Alc. 48, but not the other passages; for Ag. 620, so interpreted, would mean "I want (or, at any rate, somebody wants me¹) to make a lie seem fair, but there is no conceivably possible way"; P. V. 291 would mean "I want (or somebody wants me) to pay greater honor to some one else than to you, but there is no one to whom I possibly can"; Cho. 172 would

¹ I waive the fact that, in all the subjunctive examples from Aeschylus and Sophocles, the demand is that of the speaker himself.

mean "it is demanded that some one proceed to cut it, but there is no conceivably possible person, save one"; and O. C. 1172 would mean "I want (or, at any rate, you want me) to censure some one, but there is no one whom I can possibly censure," — all of which renderings are impossible.

(c) But a still more serious defect in the theory — a fatal one, it seems to me — lies in the fact that this meaning of "wild impossibility" is *not* fundamental in these examples. In two of them, to say nothing of Vesp. 471, the meaning is the exact opposite; namely, in Alc. 52 and Thesm. 871, — "*might* she then be spared?" and "who is here of kingly power, that *might* receive?" A moment's examination, too, will show that the thought in O. C. 1172 is not "there is no one whom I could possibly blame." These simple facts are destructive; for it is solely upon the idea of "remoteness from possibility" that Mr. Sidgwick's explanation of the grounds of the optative is based.

(2) We pass to the theory that the optatives in question are potentials. The tests to be applied to this theory would be, so far as the *force* of the idiom goes, (a) the theoretical sufficiency of the potential idea to give the actual meanings found in Mr. Sidgwick's examples, and (b) actual correspondence of these examples with others, otherwise the same, in which evidence of the potential meaning is given by the presence of *ἄν*.

(a) The potential expresses possibility. When, then, as in Alc. 52, Vesp. 471, and Thesm. 871, the main clause in a complex sentence is not negated, the potential yields at once the only meaning conceivable in the passages; namely, "is there a way by which she *might* come to old age?" "*might* she possibly in some way come to old age?" "*might* we possibly come to terms?" etc. In the case of these examples, accordingly, the theory of a potential origin meets the test of consistency with itself which Mr. Sidgwick's theory failed to meet.

When, on the other hand, the main clause is negated, the effect of the sentence as a whole is the denial of the existence of any possibility, — which is precisely the mean-

ing attached to the construction by Mr. Sidgwick's theory, though he has mistaken the place where the negation lies. It is worth while to say in passing that it is only by this negating of the main sentence that the idea of "wild impossibility" can possibly be attached to any dependent optative, itself unnegated. In other words, the question whether a given complex sentence shall express a possibility or an impossibility turns, not upon the force of the dependent clause, but upon the presence of a negative or implied negative (as often in an interrogative sentence) in the main member.

The theory that the construction is a mere potential, then, will explain Ag. 620 ("the way does not exist by which I could make a false tale seem fair," etc.), will explain Alc. 112 ("no place exists by faring forth to which one could set free the hapless woman's life"), will explain Cho. 172 ("no one else could cut it"), will explain Alc. 52 ("does a way exist by which she might"), will explain Thesm. 871 ("who is king here, that might receive guests weary," etc.), will explain P. V. 291 ("there is no man whom I could place above yourself"), and will explain the difficult sentence O. C. 1172 under its most probable interpretation (see footnote, p. 202).

So much for the dependent optatives. As to the interrogative independent construction of the same mode, it will depend wholly upon the nature of the individual case whether a given optative be taken as a serious inquiry about the existence of a possibility, or as the virtual expression of an impossibility. "How could this be done?" may mean either "inform me of the way by which the accomplishment of the act would be made possible," or may mean "how utterly impossible the act is."

The potential, then, is in its essential nature entirely competent to yield the force of complete impossibility which Mr. Sidgwick found in certain of his examples. It is also competent to account for the resemblance which, though not inherent in the idiom, he rightly found to exist between certain of his examples and the examples of the subjunctive idiom. The idea of *baffled impulse* which we find in the earlier type of the subjunctive examples (the impulse being expressed by

the subjunctive and the baffling by the denying, in the main clause, of the existence of a means, etc.) does indeed lie close to the idea of the *non-existence of a possibility* (the possibility being expressed by the potential, and the non-existence by the main sentence). And, finally, it is competent to yield the force found in the remainder of Mr. Sidgwick's examples, which express *possibility*, and which are widely separated from the examples of the subjunctive idiom.

(b) But we are not confined to a theoretical demonstration. For the competency of the essential nature of the potential to yield the force actually found in the idiom under examination is supported by the exact correspondence of these examples with other optative examples the potential character of which is made indubitable by the presence of *ἄν*. A table of parallels follows :

τεῖαν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν
ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι;

— Soph. Ant. 604.

ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα
τίς λέγοι; — Aesch. Cho. 594.¹

καὶ τί φίλος ῥέξαμι; γάμοι
πλήθουσιν ἀνίας.

— Theocr. 27, 24.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ
ἐς τὸν πολλὸν φίλοισι καρποῦσθαι
χρόνον. — Aesch. Ag. 620.

ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἀλκυστις ἐς γῆρας
μόλοι; — Eur. Alc. 52.

τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γὰρ ἅπαξ πεσὼν θανάσιμον
προπάρουθ' ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἄν
πάλιν ἀγκαλέσταιτ' ἐπαείδων;

— Aesch. Ag. 1019.

μένει δὲ μίμνοντος ἐν θρόνῳ Διὸς
παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα. θέσμιον γάρ·
τίς ἄν γονὰν ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων;
κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτα.

— Aesch. Ag. 1563.

ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα
τελευτᾷ. — T 90.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως
μὴ ἡμέρα γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμέρα δύο.

— Ar. Nub. 1181.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως διαδὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔτι
λάθοι. — Ar. Vesp. 212.

ὥστ' εἰ μὴ τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον δια-
φέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ'
ὅπως ἂν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος
γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν
ἐπιστήμην. — Plat. Lach. 184 C.

¹ In agreement with Jebb, I do not here include Mr. Sidgwick's two remaining examples. There would be no difficulty, however, in giving a long list of parallels if they were to be retained.

εἰ γάρ τις φαίη τῷ πόλει τούτῳ
πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίας γεγενῆσθαι
τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ μεγίστων κακῶν
μετὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν, οὐκ ἔστιν
ὅπως οὐκ ἀληθῇ δόξειεν ἂν λέγειν
τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ τῶν τότε γεγενη-
μένων. — ISOCR. 12, 156.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πλὴν ἑνὸς κείραιτό
νιν. — Aesch. Cho. 172.¹

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλων πέλας ἔστ' οὐδεῖς,
ὅστις ἂν εἴποι πότερον φθιμένην
βασίλειαν χρὴ πενθεῖν, ἢ ζῶσ'
ἔτι φῶς λεύσσει Πελίου παῖς.

— Eur. Alc. 79.

μητρὸς δ' ἔν Ἀιδου καὶ πατρὸς
κεκευθότοι
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάβστοι
ποτέ. — Soph. Ant. 911.

χωρίς τε γένους οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ
μείζονα μοῖραν νείμαμι ἢ σοί.

— Aesch. P. V. 291.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ναυκληρίαν
ἔσθ' ὅποι τις αἶας
στείλας . . .

δυστάνου παραλύσαι
ψυχάν. — Eur. Alc. 112.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου
ἐσθλόν τι δράσας μάρτυρ' ἂν λάβοις
πάτραν. — Eur. H. F. 186.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁποῖον στάντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου
βίον
οὐτ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν οὔτε μεμψαίμην
ποτέ. — Soph. Ant. 1156.

καὶ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί
τι; — Soph. O. C. 1172.

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρυμνῶν δωμάτων ἔχει
κράτος,
ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο . . . ;

— Ar. Thesm. 871.

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεῖς ὅστις ἂν μέμψαιτό
σε. — Eur. El. 903.

ὄρα κατ' Ἄργος εἴ τις ὑμῖν ἐγγενὴς
ἔσθ', ὅστις ἂν σου τοῦτο προσχρήζοι
τυχεῖν. — Soph. O. C. 1167.

(3) We come next to a scrutiny of the contexts of the examples under examination. In the case of two, clear evidence seems to be presented that the mode is potential.

¹ Compare the following:

ὧς οὐκ ἔσθ', ὃς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς
ἀπαλάλκοι. — X 348.

οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι
εἴσ', οἳ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν
κακότητα. — δ 166.

In the first passage from Aeschylus in the list on p. 182, *φράσαι* is beyond any reasonable doubt an optative, and, being an optative, is unquestionably potential, whether an *ἄν* is obtained by emendation or not. But the sentence of which it is the verb is exactly parallel with the sentence *τίς λέγοι*, differing from that only in being declarative where *τίς λέγοι* is interrogative. The passage runs rapidly through some of the manifestations of the power of nature, and then continues, "of the rushing wrath, too, of hurricanes, the fowls of the air and the beasts of the field can tell. But who can tell the soaring thought of man and the frenzied passion of woman's daring spirit?" The "grammatical affinities" of the idiom in question are thus clearly fixed for us by Aeschylus himself.

Similar evidence appears in the passage from the *Alcestis* of Euripides. At v. 48, Apollo, giving up the contest so far as he is concerned (but all the time knowing, as he afterwards prophesies in v. 65, that one is coming to rob Death of *Alcestis*), says, "Take then thy prey and go; for I know not whether I could persuade thee." Death answers, "Slay the one that should die? for that was our agreement." Apollo, seizing the suggested advantage, replies, "No, bring death on those who soon must die." Death retorts, "Now I catch your drift and aim." Apollo, in the familiar word-fencing fashion of the stage, again seizes a suggested advantage, and, as if Death were really yielding, asks, "Is there, then, a way by which *Alcestis* might be spared to reach old age?" to which Death, ending the matter, makes the categorical reply, "There is no way." The question in Apollo's mind in v. 48 is thus substantially identical with the question in v. 52, the former being "can she be saved through my persuasions?" the latter being "can she, then, be saved?" and in this parallelism of *ἄν εἰ πείσαιμί σε* and *ὅπως Ἀλκηστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι* the "grammatical affinities" of the idiom in question in the latter are again set forth for us by a Greek writer.

(4) The case in behalf of the potential looks, then, very strong. The force which every grammarian assigns to that mode would render its just meaning to every example.

Moreover, every example is found to have a mate in an undeniable potential sentence exactly or substantially parallel to it. And, finally, in two of the passages in which the examples under examination occur, the context itself betrays the potential force.

Manifestly, it would require a good deal of evidence to overthrow the strong probability thus established. Let us see whether the objection brought by Mr. Sidgwick will do it.

This objection will best be stated in Mr. Sidgwick's words: "If these are simple cases of an *ἄν* omitted in a relative potential clause, why are they all of one kind? Why do we never find them in positive clauses? On J. D.'s principle of explanation you ought to be able to say *εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοιεν* or *ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, usages of which there is in Attic no trace. In the examples the principal verb is always negative, or, what comes to the same thing, interrogative. Why again do we find this omission of *ἄν* with the optative, not merely in subordination only to clauses actually or virtually negative, but only to one special form of negative phrase, *οὐκ ἔστιν* (or the logically identical *τίς ἐστιν*;)? . . . It is not therefore an accident (as it would be on J. D.'s theory) that they stop with *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις κείραιτο*, and do not further extend to *ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι*, still less to *πέμπω ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι* or any such usage." (Classical Review for March, 1893.)

"It seems to me that a careful observer of language will suspect that he has not got to the bottom of the usage by simply saying '*ἄν* is omitted,' but that there is probably some other instinct at work which restricts the exceptional omission of *ἄν* to just this class (or these classes) of cases." (Ibid.)

The objection as expressed in its first form is not difficult to meet. Putting aside Mr. Sidgwick's statement that "the principal verb is always negative, or what comes to the same thing," which has been disproved above, one may first suggest that Mr. Sidgwick's point is easily turned against himself. The subjunctive idiom does in time develop a declarative and

positive main sentence, as in ἔχει ὅτι λέγει. If now the optative is only a "remoter" form, why does no corresponding declarative example of ἔχει ὅτι λέγοι, ἔστιν ὅτι λέγοι, or ἔστιν ὅπως λέγοι appear in Attic poetry? But a more decisive answer than the *ad hominem* one can be given. The reason why Attic does not, by the omission of ἄν, produce such constructions as εἶσιν οἱ λέγοιεν, ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαιμι, and πέμπω ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι, is that Attic has no such constructions *with* ἄν, or, if it has them, they are altogether too rare to be a natural field for any variation. It is probably safe to say that no case like πέμπω ὅστις ἄν ἀγγεῖλαι occurs anywhere in Attic, though combinations very like it are occasionally to be found in Homer (as in ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα, | ὅς κ' εἴποι . . ., A 62). I think I may also say with safety, from the use of indices, that no cases like εἶσιν οἱ ἄν λέγοιεν or ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν λέξαιμι declarative exist in Aeschylus or Sophocles. The second does not exist even in Homer, in spite of the greater range of the Homeric grammatical apparatus; while the first, so far as my knowledge goes, occurs but once, *viz.* in K 170, though the negative form occurs frequently, *e.g.* in E 192 and 483, Ξ 299, X 348, δ 166 and 559, and ι 125. (X 348, it may be noted, is without ἄν, and has its exact correspondent, even to phraseology, in δ 166.¹)

Nevertheless, Mr. Sidgwick's objection, though it has gone too far, has, in the second form in which it is put, some weight; for there *are* some examples in Attic of the dependent optative with ἄν, though of a different type from those which he suggests.

In answer to the difficulty thus presented, my colleague, Professor Shorey, suggests that though, as he also firmly believes, the construction is potential, the omission of ἄν may be due to the influence of the subjunctive idiom, especially in the form which it takes in dependence upon a past tense. This may be the right solution, but my feeling is against it. It seems to me that the two idioms would have

¹ The two examples are given in the footnote on p. 193.

to be much nearer neighbors in actual force, — not merely in superficial form, — and in the whole range of both, — not, as is the case, in a part of their range only, — before the one could affect the other. I am more inclined to look for a solution in the essential character of the potential construction, and to be willing to wait for this solution, even if it be not at once forthcoming in a satisfactory and final form.

In this form it is, indeed, not forthcoming. Some considerations may, however, be suggested, which may guide some one else to better results.

As regards the independent construction, the omission of *ἄν* is, in point of fact, not confined to the examples under investigation. The true potential occurs without *ἄν* in *νεοργὸς ἀνθρώπων μάθοι* (Aesch. Ag. 1163)¹; it occurs, according to the Codd., in the perfectly unobjectionable *ἴσως γὰρ ἡ κῆρυξ τις ἢ πρέσβις μόλοι* (Suppl. 727; Codd. *πρεσβήμολοι*); and it occurs in the parenthetical phrases *ὥσπερ εἴποι τις, ὡς εἴποι τις, θάσσουν ἢ λέγοι τις*, in Eur. Andr. 929 and Hipp. 1186, and Ar. Av. 180 (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 242, and Krüger, Gr. Sprachlehre II, § 54, 3, A. 8).²

Nor is the objection by any means so strong within the province of the dependent construction as might at first

¹ Wecklein holds that emendation is necessary in all these cases. Yet he grants the omission of *ἄν* in the dependent clauses under discussion.

² The optative of a fixed resolve, a derivative, as it seems to me, of the optative of ideal certainty, — to which distinction I shall presently return, — occurs without *ἄν*, according to the usual reading, in a passage cited by J. D., *viz.*:

ἀπὸ δὲ σοῦ

φεροίμαν βoscάν πάματος δυσπότου. — Aesch. Eum. 265.

The next line — *καὶ ζῶντά σ' ἰσχνάνας' ἀπάξομαι κάτω* — corroborates J. D.'s general argument that *φεροίμαν* cannot express a wish. A wish is not only in itself impossible here, but would be inconsistent with the positive statement in *σ' ἰσχνάνας' ἀπάξομαι*, — which statement, on the other hand, is entirely in keeping with the idea of a fixed resolve. Wordsworth's emendation to *φέροιμ' ἄν* is, however, so slight and easy as to commend itself to my mind.

In Cho. 854, where the Codd. have *φρένα κλέψειαν*, the emendation to *φρέν' ἄν κλέψειαν* is easy, and is hinted at, though not of course made necessary, by the metre. The passage beginning at Ag. 1374 is too difficult and uncertain of interpretation to cite in support of any doctrine.

hearing seem, as an analysis of the actually occurring examples of other kinds will show.

For these examples I am obliged, in order to save a delay which is forbidden me, to confine myself to Aeschylus and Sophocles, since there are no complete lexicons for Euripides and Aristophanes. Neither can I be sure that the collection is complete for the first two authors; for I find omissions, Ellendt's *Lexicon Sophocleum* giving, *e.g.*, only two examples of the potential with $\acute{\omega}\varsigma=\acute{\upsilon}\tau\iota$, while Dindorf's gives four.

The actually occurring examples of the dependent potential optative and of the dependent optative of ideal certainty, or the optative which is used in ordinary conclusions, softened assertions, and the like, are, if I have made no mistake, the following. I group them under these two heads :

Dependent "Potential" Proper.

- (1) τεύξει παρ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικείων στόλων,
ὅσῃν παρ' ἄλλων οὐποτ' ἂν σχέθους βροτῶν.
— Aesch. Eum. 856.
- (2) εἴσιτ' ὦ ξενοί,
ἄλλως τε καὶ φέροντες οἷ' ἂν οὔτε τις
δόμων ἀπώσαιτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἡσθείη λαβῶν.
— Soph. El. 1323.
- (3) οὐ γὰρ ἔχω πῶς ἂν
στέργαιμι κακὸν τόδε λεύσσων. — Soph. Trach. 991.
- (4) λόγος μὲν ἐστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς,
ὥς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν
θάνη τις, οὔτ' εἰ χρηστὸς οὔτ' εἴ τῳ κακός.
— Soph. Trach. 1.

Dependent Optative of Ideal Certainty.

- (5) σπλάγχων τε λειότητα, καὶ χροιάν τίνα
ἔχοντ' ἂν εἴη δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν,
χολῆς λοβοῦ τε ποικίλην εὐμορφίαν.
— Aesch. P. V. 493.

- (6) ἐμοὶ δ' ἔτι μὲν ὁμαλὸς ἄγαμος
ὁ βίος ἐν πατρὸς δόμοις,
μηδὲ κρεισσόνων ἐμοῦ
θεῶν ἄφυκτον ὄμμα προσδράκοι με.
ἀπολέμιστος ὅδε γ' ὁ πόλεμος, ἄπορα πόριμος,
οὐδ' ἔχω τίς ἂν γενοίμαν· Διὸς γὰρ οὐχ ὀρώ
μήτιν ὅπα φύγοιμ' ἄν. — Aesch. P. V. 901.
- (7) ἄρ' ἴστ', αἰοιδὰς καὶ γόους πρὸ τοῦ θανεῖν
ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς παύσαιτ' ἄν, εἰ χρεῖη λέγειν;
— Soph. Antig. 883.
- (8) ἥτις λέγεις μὲν ἀρτίως ὥς, εἰ λάβοις
σθένος, τὸ τούτων μῖσος ἐκδείξειας ἄν.
— Soph. El. 347.
- (9) ἀλγῶ 'πι τοῖς παροῦσιν· ὥστ' ἄν, εἰ σθένος
λάβοιμι, δηλώσαιμ' ἂν οἱ αὐτοῖς φρονῶ.
— Soph. El. 333.
- (10) λέγ', ἐπεὶ σὲ λέχος δουριάλωτον
στέρξας ἀνέχει θούριος Αἴας·
ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν αἰδρις ὑπείποις. — Soph. Ai. 211.
- (11) ἀλλ' εὖ γε μέντοι τοῦτ' ἐπίστασ' ὥς ἐγώ
σοὶ μὲν νέμοιμ' ἂν τῆσδε καὶ μείζω χάριν·
— Soph. Ai. 1370.
- (12) ὥστ' οὐχὶ μαντείας γ' ἂν οὔτε τῇδ' ἐγώ
βλέψαιμ' ἂν οὔνεκ' οὔτε τῇδ' ἂν ὕστερον.
— Soph. O. T. 857.
- (13) ἀλλ' ἵλεω ἐμὲ τὸν ἰκέτην δεξαίατο·
ὥς οὐχ ἔδρας γῆς τῆσδ' ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι.
— Soph. O. C. 44.
- (14) ὥστε ξένον γ' ἂν οὐδέν' ὄνθ', ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν,
ὑπεκτραποίμην μὴ οὐ συνεκσφώζειν·
— Soph. O. C. 565.

Two examples remain which cannot be assigned with certainty to the one class rather than to the other, though the first would appear more probably to belong to the second :

- (15) οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅποιον στάντ' ἄν ἀνθρώπου βίον
οὐτ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν οὔτε μεμψαίμην ποτέ.

— Soph. Antig. 1156.

- (16) ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐνδίκως γ' ἀτιμάζοιτό σοι ·

— Soph. Ai. 1342.

To some of my readers, this division of the non-wishing optative into two classes will have no weight, and the argument founded upon it will have no justification. I know, indeed, of no grammar that sufficiently insists upon the distinction. But the distinction, nevertheless, has long seemed to me not only a real, but an important one. There is a vital difference between "I can" and "in a certain event I surely should," between "he may perhaps" and "he surely would." If we should not tolerate a translation in which "might" was used where the idea was "would," or *vice versa*, no more should we be indifferent to the same difference in the exposition of Greek or Latin syntax.¹

Now the examples of the idiom which we have to explain are all translated by Mr. Sidgwick by the formula "could" or "could possibly," and cannot be translated by "would." We should, therefore, in weighing the force of his last argument, set aside all examples of the optative of ideal certainty, — of which the meaning is clearly different.

If this be done, there remain five sure and six possible examples of the true potential, three (1, 2, and 15) in a relative clause, one (3) in an interrogative, one (16) in a consecutive with ὥστε, and one (4) in the Oratio Obliqua after ὥς.

Of the three in the relative clause, one, namely (16), is cast in the same form with the examples of the problematical idiom. Similar sentences could also, of course, be framed with the other two relative forms οἷος and ὅσος, as οὐκ ἔστι τύχη ὅσην ἂν [οὔαν ἂν] αἰνέσαιο πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ τις.

¹ There is, of course, a neutral border country between the two, and examples are easy to find which you may translate by either "could" or "would," as in "quis hoc credat?" But this does not lessen the difference where the difference exists.

We may, then, describe the general state of affairs thus : In potential relative clauses, *ἄν* may be either used or omitted. In interrogative and consecutive clauses and clauses quoted after *ὥς*, we have no evidence that it is ever omitted ; but, on the other hand, we have but a single example of each of these to go upon. The number of actual cases that support Mr. Sidgwick's objection is thus so small—so far as we can judge from two out of the four authors concerned—as to carry little weight.

Before leaving the subject, however, I wish to suggest a possible line of inquiry with regard to the really controlling reason for the omission of *ἄν*. Our knowledge of the history and force of this particle is exceedingly small ; but most writers agree in describing it as having meant originally something like "in a given case" (*ἔπειτα*), and having come finally to be a sign of "contingency," of dependence upon some assumption,—not of course necessarily expressed, but underlying the thought. If this is so, we should not expect to see the particle omitted with any freedom in cases of the optative of ideal certainty, since that always has the feeling of contingency underlying it. In two of the examples just given, *viz.* in (8) and (9), an actual condition is expressed ; in (6), the questions in the last two verses do not turn upon things as they are, but upon an imaginary case previously clearly implied ; in (5), *ἔχοντα* is in effect a condition ; in (13), the clause of wish in the first verse quoted forms a condition ; while in the rest also there is a sense of *some* assumption underlying each statement. The particle of "contingency," the particle suggesting some idea like "in that case," or "in an imaginable case," is therefore much in place.

It is also much in place in strictly potential sentences where the "possibility" is not absolutely existent, but hangs upon something, as in κ 268 : ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖσδεσι θᾶσσον | φεύγωμεν· ἔτι γάρ κεν [=φεύγοντες] ἀλύξαιμεν κακὸν ἡμᾶρ. In the examples on which Mr. Sidgwick founded his theory, on the other hand, there is no sense of contingency whatever, but only the bare idea of "possibility." Now the use of *ἄν* has become fixed in ordinary use, by Attic times, in the poten-

tial construction, whether with or without contingency, as (substantially) it had already done by Homeric times in the construction of ideal certainty.¹ But the Attic writers for the stage liked to impart an archaic flavor to their style. They used *νιν* for the pronoun of the third person. They used *ἐς* for *εἰς*. In older Greek they found an occasional omission of *ἄν*. They accordingly omitted it occasionally themselves, using this license with comparative freedom in the case of present and future conditions in the subjunctive and in the case of *πρίν*-clauses, etc., where the omission could not possibly lead to confusion, and, much more sparingly and cautiously still, in the case of the potential optative, where they never passed outside the limits of a bare *unconditioned possibility*, as seen in phrases like *ὥς εἴποι τις, ὥσπερ εἴποι τις, θάσσουν ἢ λέγοι τις*, and in the examples of similar feeling (a point by no means to be overlooked) which have formed the subject of this paper.

Such a view has also something to commend it in the phraseology and historical sequence of the eight dependent examples. The oldest of them—the three from Aeschylus—are in the negative (*οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ*). So is also the example *οὐδὲ . . . ἔσθ' ὅποι* from Euripides. Two others take the corresponding form of inquiry, without the negative (*ἔσθ' ὅπως* ;). There then remain two cases, Thesm. 871 and O. C. 1172. The former, which is the latest of all, is put by Aristophanes into the mouth of Euripides, and might therefore be expected to be somewhat unusual in expression. In simpler form it would have been “is there some one here in authority, that might receive us?—can some one here receive us?” (= *ἔσθ' ὅστις* ;), and so is essentially of the same feeling as the *ἔσθ' ὅπως* of Aristophanes or of Euripides himself. The example O. C. 1172, though not late, is possibly farther removed from the type.² Seven of the eight examples, however, fall within the

¹ Such an omission as the one in Pindar's *κεινὸς ἐλγν* (Ol. 3, 45) is very rare even in Homer.

² This much discussed example (see Madvig, *Advers. Crit.* I., pp. 189 seq.) is the only one of the whole eight the meaning of which is not perfectly clear. It

type *οὐκ ἔστιν*, or *ἔστιν* interrogative, plus relative pronoun. Now, if we remember the extremely frequent recurrence of the idea of the denial of possibility in the combination *οὐκ ἔστιν* plus relative (seen not only, in Homeric and Attic Greek, with the potential plus *ἄν*, but also, in Attic, with the subjunctive, as appears in Part I., and even, indeed, with the indicative itself, in one of the commonest uses of the combination), it would seem that, if *ἄν* were anywhere to be omitted, here was a place where the mode and the introductory phrase together might safely be trusted to convey the potential meaning, — just as, in the independent interrogative, it was safe to trust to the association of the potential idea with the optative question obviously implying a negative answer. This step having been taken with the dependent examples in the *denial* of possibility, as in our three earliest examples, it would then be a natural further advance to use the same formula in the

surely cannot mean “who is there whom I could possibly censure?” as it would have to do if Mr. Sidgwick is right in saying (see p. 195 of this paper) “in subordination . . . only to one special form of negative phrase, *οὐκ ἔστιν*, or the logically identical *τίς ἐστιν*;”. The main clause, following *ἔξοιδ’ ἀκούων τῶνδ’ ὅς ἐσθ’ ὁ προστάτης*, must mean, not “who *is* there?” but “who is *the man*?” The force wanted for the sentence as a whole in the context is “who in the world can the man be whom — following your commands — I am to reject?” Donner gives it this force (“und wer denn ist es, den ich so verwerfen soll?”), and so, apparently, does Jebb in his translation (“and who can he be, against whom I should have a grief?”). To get this exact force, however, we ought to have a subjunctive clause, similar to the *τὶν’ ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἥκεις, ἐφ’ ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγνίς* of Ar. Eq. 1321. The true optative does not lend itself easily to subordination, and so could not express the wish of another than the speaker. The optative with *ἄν* sometimes has the meaning of propriety, but hardly in such a combination. We thus seem driven to the theory of a mixture of two thoughts in the main sentence, the relative clause being attached to the one which is not formally expressed, so that the sentence means “who in the world can this man be, — at least that could incur my censure?” or, in expanded form, “who in the world can this man be?” and “is there some man that might incur my censure [so that I should yield to your demand]?” This would seem to be substantially the force of Jebb’s rendering in his commentary: “who is he, to whom I could possibly have any objection?” But if the interpretation is right, then the relative clause with its suppressed antecedent conception, involving as it does an *ἔστιν* ὅν γ’ ἐγὼ *ψέξαιμι* *τις*; is parallel to the *ἔσθ’ ὅπως μύλοι* of Euripides and the *τίς ἔχει κράτος* *δοτὶς δέξαιτο* of Aristophanes, and so is after all essentially of the same type with the other seven examples.

question of possibility, especially if, as may well have been the case, there had previously been an intermediate use in a question implying denial.

My conception of the present state of the question, to sum up, is as follows :

Mr. Sidgwick's theory is in any case disproved ; for, even if the independent use claimed were not so infrequent as to make an extension into the dependent form improbable, and even if the fact that it is based upon an unknown cause were to be overlooked, yet (1) the fundamental meaning which, in keeping with that assumed cause, and as against a potential origin, Mr. Sidgwick assigns to his examples, is precisely the meaning which, in many of the examples, the potential would yield, and (2) this same fundamental meaning is wholly absent from others of his examples, and (3) the subjunctive idiom and the one in question are essentially unlike, in that the former, in all but one of the twenty-five examples thus far adduced, expresses an impulse or demand, which meaning is absent from several of Mr. Sidgwick's examples. Whatever may be thought of any other solution, then, this theory must, it seems to me, be abandoned.

Only one other theory deserving serious consideration has thus far been advocated, the theory that the verbs in question are potentials in the strict sense. This theory meets every condition except one. It accounts for the force of impossibility found in a number of the examples. It accounts for the force of possibility overlooked by Mr. Sidgwick in the others. It receives great strength from the fact that every one of the examples can be shown to have an exact correspondent in an unquestioned potential. It receives great strength from the fact that, in the case of two of the examples, the Greek poet has, for our better guidance, expressed an exactly parallel idea, in the immediate context, by an unquestionable potential. It is possibly defective at one point, in case, namely, of the failure of my explanation that the omission of *ἄν* in these cases of unconditioned potentiality with *(οὐκ) ἔσθ' ὅπως* and *ὅποι* and the equivalent *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις* and allied phrases, was, if not first suggested, at

least made easier and safer through the association of the potential idea with the phrase *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως*, in its frequent use with optative, subjunctive, and indicative, and that there is accordingly nothing remarkable in the fact that the omission is not found in the widely removed constructions of result, quotation, and indirect question. Yet, even if this explanation be not accepted, the defect is not a grave one, since there is reason to believe that the total number of examples with which the comparison is to be made is small (possibly only two, certainly not more than three, for two out of the four scenic poets), and since our knowledge of the force of the particle on which the difficulty turns is confessedly imperfect. My own conclusion, then, is that there is an extremely strong probability that the ultimate solution of the problem will justify the view now commonly held, by making of the examples in dispute nothing but ordinary potentials.